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1  Introduction
1 2
What happened on 9/11/01 changed our everyday lives 
everywhere. City centres, malls, traffic infrastructures, but 
also the global transport network, have been altered sig-
nificantly by post-9/11 security governance (Simon, 2007). 
Whilst the consequences for the aviation sector have been 
well documented (Blalock, Kadivali, & Simon, 2007; Lyon, 
2006; Seidenstat, 2004) the drastic changes in post-9/11 secu-
rity governance structures in maritime transport have been 
subject to much more limited scrutiny (Eski, 2011). Maritime 
transport is responsible for moving 80% of everything we 
consume (UNCTAD, 2015). Ships and ports are essential 
for the global trade in goods; their importance becomes in 
particular to everyone’s attention as soon as there is a disrup-
tion in the flow of goods, which causes prices to increase in 
supermarkets or at your local gas station. The domain of the 
maritime world, the mass of people involved and the activi-
ties undertaken are significant, if not vital to today’s global 
economy. To safeguard the globalised society’s economic 
growth from danger and insecurities, the maritime domain 
demands intensive security awareness. Its people and their 
activities should be protected by establishing high levels of 
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maritime security (Christopher, 2009), in a just way and cus-
tomised to the maritime sector’s specific needs.
In a post 9/11 climate, heightened port security measures 
are characterised by sophisticated networks of multi-agency 
policing bodies as different state administered policing and 
customs organisations operate alongside security services 
(Urciuoli, Sternberg, & Ekwall, 2010; Hoogenboom, 2010). 
On the one hand, these agencies and services are considered 
to deal with the ordinary and mundane aspects of everyday 
transport; on the other, ports are considered key intersections 
of crime and control, harm and protection, and threat and se-
curity (Chalk, 2008). 
In addition to a general lack of public interest in the port 
as a vital economic site, sociological and criminological inter-
ests in ports has been remarkably scarce as well. Criminology 
in particular has been slow to develop empirical and theoreti-
cal research on (trans)port security (Zedner, 2007). So far, and 
not until recently, only a few criminologists have undertaken 
long-term research focusing on port security—in particu-
lar port security governance—in Australia and the USA, the 
Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom (Brewer, 
2014; Eski, 2012, 2015; Eski & Carpenter, 2013; Hoogenboom, 
2010; Malcolm, 2011). More criminological attention should 
be paid to port security in other parts of the world too, as 
well as that criminological light should be shed on security of 
ports that are not listed as the busiest and largest ports, per se.
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When focusing on the 20 busiest ports in the world of 
the last four years, (only) three European ports are includ-
ed: Rotterdam (11th), Hamburg (15th) and Antwerp (17th) 
(UNCTAD, 2014: 66). Central and Southeast European ports 
are absent, and when looking at the top 20 European ports, 
Hamburg (2nd), Bremerhaven (4th) and Gdansk (20th) are the 
most important Central European ports (Port of Rotterdam 
Authority, 2015). However, there is no port in or close to 
Southeast Europe listed. These top 20 lists are based on the 
cargo and container through-put, and not on maritime and 
port security as a factor. However, seen from a security per-
spective, Central and Southeast European ports do matter 
because: “[t]he littorals that surround the Balkan Peninsula 
are especially prone to abuses, including threats to port se-
curity, maritime pollution and natural disasters, piracy, ille-
gal fishing, migration, and the illicit trafficking of humans, 
drugs, and weapons” (Nation, 2013: 207). The border between 
Central Europe and Southeast Europe is located on Slovenian 
territory, so the Slovenian Port of Koper, (next to two smaller 
Slovenian ports, the Port of Izola and Port of Piran) there-
fore, forms a vital transport hub for not just Central Europe, 
but also the coastal zone and hinterland of Southeast Europe 
(Belt, Chapsos, & Samardžić, 2013).
This article focuses on the Port of Koper, its security gov-
ernance provision, and considers the very unique security 
challenges faced by those policing the movement of people 
and goods at this crucial juncture in Eastern Europe. To con-
textualise contemporary maritime security governance chal-
lenges the articles draws upon lessons learned from an ethno-
graphic study on port security in the Port of Rotterdam (Eski, 
2015). As a port considered to be the most secure in Europe 
(Parliament of Canada, 2006), Rotterdam identifies itself with 
the continuous advancement of port security: “Rotterdam 
should be known as the city with the most modern, the clean-
est and most secure port in the world” (Rotterdam Municipality, 
2013: 9 – emphasis added by authors). The discussion will draw 
on the experience of Rotterdam, the largest port in Europe, to 
distil learning and best practice development for Koper to en-
gage in developing its port security strategy. First, however, an 
overview of the Port of Koper shall follow.
2  An overview of the Port of Koper
In 1957, the dredging of the sea bottom on the north coast 
of the City of Koper ushered in the development of the Port 
of Koper (Luka Koper in Slovenian language), with the first 
ship mooring some eighteen months later. Following the de-
velopment of berths, in 1963 the customs zone was set up. 
Four years later, the construction of the 31 kilometres railway 
track from Koper to Prešnica was completed, which enabled 
the Port of Koper to be included in the European railway sys-
tem (Jakomin, 2007). One year later, a petroleum facility com-
menced its activities, followed by the instalment and running 
of a chemical facility in 1972; that same year a timber facility 
started to handle cargo. In 1973, the first containers arrived, 
making the Port of Koper inter-modal and prepared to deal 
with combined transport, which consequently led to the first 
container line in Koper connecting with the Mediterranean 
and to the construction of a container terminal that started 
to operate in 1979. Six years later, in 1984, a terminal for coal 
and iron ore was completed, followed by the construction of a 
grain silo. In 1988, a new cotton warehouse and a terminal for 
borates and phosphorus acid were constructed, after which 
oil and alumina terminals were built. With all of these new 
terminals, towards the end of the 1980s, the cargo throughput 
rose to 5 million tons (Jakomin, 2007).
The economic and political changes Slovenia experi-
enced in the first half of the 1990s brought new challenges 
to the country. Due to a significant loss of business, because 
of retreating Yugoslav customers, the Port of Koper gradually 
started to deal with customers from Central European markets 
(Jakomin, 2007). In 1996, the Port of Koper became a public 
limited company and the company’s shares were listed on the 
Ljubljana Stock Exchange. That year the car terminal began 
operating and one year later the construction of the Livestock 
Terminal began. By investing in the separate collection of 
waste and its processing, setting up sea monitoring, and es-
tablishing co-operation with international organizations, the 
Port of Koper systemically approached environmental man-
agement and adapted to the standards of the European Union 
(Luka Koper, 2015c), for which in 2000 the port received the 
ISO 14001 environmental certificate.
During 2001 and 2002, investment funds were set aside 
for the construction of a new shore and the arrangement of 
moorings and warehousing premises at Pier II. On the initia-
tive of the Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Slovenia, 
the Port of Koper had a leading role in a pilot project of the 
Slovenian transport logistic cluster, whose basic objective is 
the promotion of Slovenian transport routes (Jakomin, 2007). 
In 2004 the company reorganized the coal and iron ore fa-
cility, and renamed it the European Energy Terminal. In the 
meantime, the cargo throughput exceeded 12 million tons. 
More importantly, the port received the status of an EU port 
and border inspection post for goods entering and leaving the 
EU customs zone, influencing security and border control on 
a daily basis. 
In 2006, a new business strategy was adopted (Luka Koper 
2006, 2007), and was still in use in 2015. The company Adria 
Terminals Ltd. was established in 2007 for the purpose of oper-
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ating the inland terminal in Sežana, which enlarged the Port of 
Koper to an area of 110.000 sq. meters. This was an important 
step towards the development of the transport logistic centres 
network, which would in the future provide essential support 
for the Port of Koper (Luka Koper, 2008). The first part of a 
new operational and marketing IT system (TinO) was started 
in the same year; the best ideas in a public competition for a 
complete port area arrangement were rewarded. The founda-
tion for the extension of the first pier of the container termi-
nal and for the new car warehouse was placed as well in 2007. 
An important development was the acquisition of the ISO 
22000:2005 Food Safety System Certificate, allowing for more 
types of food-specific cargo handling (Luka Koper, 2008). In 
2008, the Port of Koper and the Republic of Slovenia signed a 
concession agreement, which settled issues related to port ac-
tivities, management, development and ordinary maintenance 
of the port infrastructure (Luka Koper, 2009). That same year 
was also denoted for an extensive investment cycle in the port 
infrastructure, consisting of an extension of operations on 
shore of Pier 1 and the building of a new warehouse for 2.750 
cars. Noteworthy is the fact that the daughter company Adria 
Transport Ltd. purchased three train locomotives that started 
to operate as the first private railroad operation in Slovenia. 
Its activities are currently oriented towards the Slovenian, 
Austrian and German markets. 2008 marked the development 
of consensus between employees and management and a new 
collective agreement, which invigorates a long-run balance 
between economic, social and environment viewpoints of 
development orientations, was formalized (ibid.). The follow-
ing year, major investments in the infrastructure were made 
to service modern container ships and other types of cargo 
(Luka Koper, 2010a). The extended container quay, the en-
larged warehousing area, and four new post-Panamax cranes 
and other equipment, made it possible to receive ships with 
a capacity up to 8,000 TEU. The construction of a warehouse 
for cars with 4,100 parking spaces was completed and the con-
struction of a terminal for alcohol was placed into service in 
2010 (Luka Koper, 2011a). That same year, a record through-
put at Port of Koper’s Container Terminal surpassed 400,000 
TEU, making it the largest in the Northern Adriatic. Also, a 
new container service started to provide a direct link between 
Koper and the Far East. In addition to joining the EU’s Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), the Port of Koper be-
gan providing public information on sustainable development 
via its website Living with the Port (www.zivetispristaniscem.
si). This portal provides real-time data on the average hourly 
noise level, monitored at two peripheral points within the port 
zone (Luka Koper, 2010b). The European Commission issued 
a decision as to its co-funding the second stage of the renewal 
and modernisation of the Koper – Divača railway line, which 
allowed the Port of Koper to increase rail cargo services to its 
European hinterland.
Since 2011, more than 100,000 cruise guests passed 
through Koper’s passenger terminal in its first six years of 
operation. The Slovenian government endorsed the National 
Spatial Plan (NSP) for the comprehensive spatial arrangement 
of the Port of Koper, which is a document that will enable 
the long-term development of the port as well as enhance its 
competitive advantages (Luka Koper, 2012a, 2012b). In 2012, 
the Port of Koper commenced dredging the access channels to 
Basin I - an important step towards enhancing the competi-
tiveness of the port. A container vessel, the 318-metre long 
and 43-metre wide Mærsk Karlskrona with its 7,908-TEU ca-
pacity, and a cruise liner, the Celebrity Silhouette, have been 
the largest vessels to call at the Port of Koper Luka Koper d.d 
(Luka Koper, 2013a, 2013b). In fulfilling its societal responsi-
bilities, the Port of Koper commenced publication of data on 
sea quality via its Living with the Port sustainable develop-
ment portal (Luka Koper, 2015a). In 2013, the Port of Koper 
managed to acquire all necessary consents and permits for 
the creation of sites to deposit dredged silts; this allowed sea-
bed dredging to commence in Basin I to a depth of 13 me-
tres at the Container Terminal quayside (Luka Koper, 2014). 
The Slovenian Maritime Administration issued a permit to 
increase permitted maximum draughts of vessels using the 
Terminal from 11.4 to 12.5 metres, and, as a consequence, 
container ships calling at the port were able to carry an addi-
tional 3,600 TEU. In tandem with these dredging operations, 
work started on the construction of new container storage fa-
cilities at the head of Pier I. In terms of environmental aware-
ness, the Port of Koper has been awarded the European Sea 
Ports Organization (ESPO) Award in recognition of its work 
in creating a sustainable future for the port and its surround-
ings (ESPO, 2015). The ISCC EU certificate has been obtained 
as well, making it possible for the Port to unload and store oil, 
rapeseed, soya oil, palm biodiesel, bioethanol and used cook-
ing oil, in accordance with the European Commission (EC) 
Directive on stimulating the use of renewable energy resourc-
es (Luka Koper, 2014). 
Today the Port of Koper is a modern multipurpose sea-
port, and IMO-classified as a mid-size port. It is also an EU 
port of entry, with full border inspection port facilities. The 
Port of Koper is a public limited company and Slovenia’s sole 
seaport and maritime gateway to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (Luka Koper, 2015a). The Port of Koper has a 
port authority with limitations related to state administration, 
and  port activities and terminal operations are supplemented 
and enriched by a variety of ancillary services provided by 
the port’s subsidiary enterprises, and further enhanced by the 
company’s provision of logistics and related value-added busi-
ness services to its clientele (Luka Koper, 2015c). Port opera-
tions at Koper are conducted within the context of 12 special-
ized terminal operations, handling and warehousing various 
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types of goods, such as container freight, fruit and perishable 
goods, livestock, cars, timber, as well as dry-bulk, liquid and 
general cargo (Luka Koper, 2015a). Koper is especially well-
connected with the Far East and South-East Asia, with weekly 
container services with highly competitive transit times.
The Port of Koper’s vision is to become a leading port 
and logistics system provider for the countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Key development directions over the coming 
years shall encompass the full utilisation of the existing infra-
structure and the development of new capacities, particularly 
in regards to the container freight and car businesses (Luka 
Koper, 2015a). An upgraded and enhanced service structure 
shall be created through active marketing and the necessary 
provision of fully integrated logistics services, together with 
a variety of supplementary services intended to increase the 
value of shipped cargos as well as ensure merchandise is mar-
ket ready (Luka Koper, 2015c). In short, investments shall in-
crease the efficiency and competitiveness of port operations 
and, at the same time, ensure client satisfaction, reduce energy 
consumption and maintain ecological standards. In order to 
understand how these investments and changes to the Port 
of Koper relate to port security challenges and ambitions, it 
is vital to explore how port security has developed since the 
beginning of the 21st century. The following section elaborates 
the most important piece of international legislation of port 
security: the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code.
3  The ISPS Code
Until recently, port security has not been a topic of con-
cern for (international) maritime law and legislation. Instead, 
the main focus was on ship and cargo safety, of which the most 
important landmark was the installation of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). It took al-
most 40 years and the events of 9/11 before port security was 
set high on the agenda. Designed by the IMO, the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was created after 
the Twin Tower attacks. It is typical post-9/11 antiterrorist leg-
islation (Eski, 2011), reflected in the Code’s preamble:
Following the tragic events of 11th September 2001, the 
twenty-second session of the Assembly of the International 
Maritime Organization (the Organization), in November 2001, 
unanimously agreed to the development of new measures relat-
ing to the security of ships and of port facilities for adoption by 
a Conference of Contracting Governments to the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (known as the dip-
lomatic Conference on Maritime Security) in December 2002 
(ISPS code 2003: 2) (IMO, 2003).
The Code’s purpose is to harmonise and standardise port 
security on a national level, which has rearranged the en-
tire maritime sector (George & Whatford, 2007). The Code 
was adopted in 2002, pushing ports that accepted the Code 
to live up to the Code’s demands from 1 July 2004 onwards. 
Compliance with the Code consists of meeting the require-
ments of its provisions given in the obligatory part A, as well 
as in non-obligatory part B (IMO, 2003). Although aiming for 
international integration, harmonisation and standardisation, 
the Code recognises ‘that the extent to which the guidance 
applies may vary depending on the nature of the port facility 
and of the ship, its trade and/or cargo’ (IMO, 2003: preamble 
section 9).
The ISPS Code defines several parties and activities to 
strengthen port security. The Contracting Government (CG) 
is the principal actor that delegates the roles, as described 
by the ISPS Code, to organisations and individuals, such as 
law enforcement, security services and port facilitators. It re-
mains, however, in charge of crucial ISPS Code-based govern-
ance of a port. An important CG task is setting the security 
levels by which a port operates. The measures that come for-
ward should cause minimum interference to daily activities 
and the flow of transport (section 14.1). There are three lev-
els, where Level 1 is always present, Level 2 stands for height-
ened security (e.g. significant terrorist threat), and Level 3 
is exceptional (e.g. terrorist attack). The CG also approves a 
Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA) and a Port Facility 
Security Plan (PFSP). The PFSA and PFSP must guarantee 
continuous development and upgrading of security by iden-
tifying (threats to) critical infrastructures and weaknesses. 
Given the differences in security threats and risks per port, 
PFSP’s and PFSA’s differ from port to port. Other CG tasks 
include the monitoring through Port State Control (PSC) and 
appointing Port Facility Security Officers (PFSOs), and it is up 
to the PFSO to develop, implement, revise and maintain the 
PFSP, and to regularly engage with Company Security Officers 
(CSO). The PFSO also controls one or more port facilities, 
carries out frequent security inspections, provides adequate 
personnel training, communicates with authorities about 
security threats, and appoints security services. Finally, the 
PFSO cooperates with Ship Security Officers (SSOs) through 
the design and application of the Declaration of Security 
(DoS), which is a document that assesses the potential threat 
ships can pose to a port area and addresses security require-
ments shared between a port and a ship.
All in all, the ISPS Code outlines how ship and port se-
curity ought to be established by a multi-agency of security 
services, law enforcement and port authorities, overseen by 
state control (Urciuoli, Sternberg, & Ekwall 2010). The ISPS 
Code has been introduced and implemented in the Port of 
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Koper as well; a port that has its global as well as local security 
challenges to deal with. The following section explores the key 
challenges the port security department of the Port of Koper 
is confronted with.
4  The Port of Koper’s Security Challenges
The Port of Koper is part of a global transport network, 
a well-used and serviced port that is a crucial feature of the 
Slovenian transport and trading infrastructures. The port se-
curity challenges that present themselves are many and have 
changed since the end of the cold war, especially within the 
last decade. EU and NATO membership has put Slovenia 
on the world map, and although it remains a relatively small 
country, the threats of terrorism, cybercrime, climate changes 
and pollution are just a few of the risks that have the potential 
to seriously affect the Port of Koper (Kankaraš, 2011; Nation, 
2013). The port accommodates all types of industrial facili-
ties where transport and storage of hazardous materials takes 
place, and these and other kind of highly flammable materials 
must be protected by fire safety measures. In the Port of Koper, 
there is also heavy road and railway traffic and a significant 
amount of heavy transport equipment, which invites all sorts 
of safety and security-related complexities (Kankaraš, 2011). 
The fact that the Port of Koper is widely open at the seaside, 
also brings all kinds of surveillance capacity complexities into 
play. Currently, the security measures on the landside (the 
piers) are tightened and security is present on a daily basis 
(Luka Koper, 2011b). As the Port is in direct connection with 
the town of Koper, the passenger terminal and general cargo 
warehouses are separated from the city by a fence, so some 
of the port (security) operations affect the local community 
when it comes to their movement and mobility.
In order to guarantee the Port of Koper and its surround-
ing urban areas remain safe from harm and insecure situations, 
port security is delivered by the Port of Koper’s own security 
department. The department consists of five subdivisions: a 
security service unit, a firefighter unit, a crisis management 
division, a maritime security, and a sensitive data protection 
unit (Luka Koper, 2015b). For the coordination of cargo han-
dling activities and navigation, a security communication 
centre is in place. Together these units are responsible for the 
maintenance of a safe and secure working environment in the 
Koper docks. The main task of the department is to protect 
people and property from any risk, in close cooperation with 
many stakeholders responsible for national security, the port 
company itself and its business partners (Kankaraš, 2011). 
The maintenance of security in the Port of Koper demands 
fast and prudent decisions that will not affect port operations 
nor decrease security levels. Having a well-trained and profes-
sional security staff in place is an important aspect of the de-
partment. Furthermore, security awareness of all employees 
and partners is provided through different types of education, 
training and (digital) communication (Kankaraš, 2011). 
One of the crucial tasks of the port security department 
is the design and advancement of the Port Facility Security 
Plan (PFSP) that must be in compliance with the ISPS Code, 
European directives and Slovenian regulations on ship and 
port security (Kankaraš, 2013). In order to be compliant, the 
department has ensured that various security services and 
equipment are present at the Port of Koper, such as CCTV 
monitoring, (automated) access control, and different alerting 
sensors to support and maintain security.
The department’s staff is trained and equipped to act as a 
first responder team in case of an emergency (e.g. fire, explo-
sion, leakage and pollution). The Port of Koper has different 
emergency plans, business continuity plans, and risk man-
agement plans to make sure the right protocols are followed 
in the case of an emergency. The crisis management centre, 
along with its staff, is responsible for handling all kinds of 
emergency scenarios (Luka Koper, 2015b). To safeguard their 
effective response, the staff undergo regular exercises, in addi-
tion to rehearsals that are conducted amongst them, as well as 
that safety equipment is updated frequently. 
As a final note, next to living up to (inter)national mari-
time and port security regulations, and having various se-
curity technologies and services in place, the port security 
department has established close cooperation with different 
ministries, the police, customs agencies, security services 
and the Municipality of Koper (Kankaraš, 2015). This multi-
agency policing approach to port security by the department 
is one of being proactive in maintaining existing and estab-
lishing new public-private partnerships (PPPs), because effec-
tive multi-agency cooperation and coordination is essential 
for port security, accompanied by all types of multi-agency 
policing challenges.
The ambition of the security department is to tackle the 
increasingly more complex, dynamic and challenging security 
environment by establishing and organizing an effective cor-
porate security system that will assure proactive and efficient 
safety and security in and for the Port of Koper (Luka Port, 
2013a). A corporate security system could be developed to 
achieve a more efficient and coordinated approach towards 
effective port security, and in doing so, security has to be 
governed from a centralized point of reference. Ideally, at top 
management levels, various experts are made responsible for 
management of (decentralized and) independent services, 
and in this way, smaller teams of experts will communicate 
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to a core group of expert superiors that is responsible for the 
overall security governance. For the Port of Koper, such an 
introduction of centralized, and intensified coordination and 
cooperation would provide several advantages to run port 
security more effectively. Currently, management training is 
in place, during which company specific businesses, risks and 
organizational structures are taken into account. The develop-
ment of such a corporate security system requires more co-
operation with security services, and it is equally important 
to (re)consider and advance security technologies to keep up 
with the dynamics of the Port of Koper’s development and 
changing security challenges. A well trained, professional se-
curity staff is fundamental to guarantee the effectiveness of 
the corporate security system. 
In order to understand multi-agency port policing, and 
the application of a corporate security system consisting of 
professional(ized) staff and advanced technologies in the 
port, a study dealing with operational port security reali-
ties conducted in the Port of Rotterdam will be considered. 
Attention shall be paid to the operational realities and atti-
tudes. Particular focus shall be put on 1) how these officers 
consider multi-agency cooperation and 2) technologization of 
their daily port security realities. The main findings on these 
aspects, derived from the study, will be used to provide re-
commendations for the Port of Koper.
5  Lessons Learned from the Port of Rotterdam
5.1  The Port of Rotterdam
Being a classical European port having roots in medi-
eval times, the Port of Rotterdam grew significantly when 
the shipping container was introduced and radically changed 
cargo sizes, ships and worker communities in ports and on 
deck. The Flag of Convenience (FOC) system changed the 
entire shipping industry, including the ports of Rotterdam 
and Koper and is a system that allows a ship to bear a flag 
of a more fiscally convenient country. It entails the ‘flagging 
out’ because of registration at low costs, almost no taxes to 
be paid, and much freedom on the ship owner’s side to em-
ploy cheap labour (McConnell, 2012). These major changes 
in shipping introduced Rotterdam to more shippers coming 
from an increasing number of places from all over the world. 
At that same time, technological advancements in ports im-
proved the handling of cargo, which lowered costs (Branch, 
2007), and now, due to the technological specialisation and 
sophistication, there are fully automated berths in Rotterdam, 
where unmanned vehicles are operated entirely by computer 
to transport cargo (Van Hooydonk, 2006). 
Until 2002, the Port of Rotterdam was the largest and 
busiest port in the world, and the most important European 
port. The city centre of Rotterdam used to be directly con-
nected with the port, geographically and socio-economically, 
but due to the expansion towards the North Sea, the urban 
community has become increasingly disconnected from the 
port (Van Hooydonk, 2006). Nevertheless, despite the expan-
sion towards the North Sea and less port business activity in 
the old city centre harbours, the Port of Rotterdam devotes…
…attention to the relationship between the city and the port. 
Through various projects, we [PRA] are making the port visible 
in the centre of Rotterdam. These include the LED screen with 
images of the port in the entrance hall of Rotterdam Central 
Station (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2013: 2).
The recent extension of the port, called the Maasvlakte 2, 
is directly located at the North Sea, and has the capacity to re-
ceive the world’s largest cargo vessels. The Port of Rotterdam, 
from city to shore, is over 40km long with 65 kilometres of 
quayside, and it covers approximately 12,500ha of land and 
water, of which 6,000ha consists of business sites and (Port of 
Rotterdam Authority, 2015).
In all its aspects, the port is an infrastructural node, glob-
ally connected and accessible 24/7 to ships that have their 
first and/or last port of call in Europe. The port is multi-
modal, meaning trains, inland ships, road transport, and (oil) 
pipelines come in and out, day and night as well (Van Sluis, 
Marks, Gilleir, & Easton, 2012). Moreover, because of its size 
and business, the port is vital to the regional and national 
economy, contributing 3.5% to the Dutch GDP and providing 
180,000 jobs (Port of Rotterdam Authority, 2015). Although 
the global financial crisis and austerity had a major impact on 
the maritime transport, the Port of Rotterdam seemed unaf-
fected and handled almost 50% of the world’s container port 
throughput in 2012 (EuroStat, 2012).
5.2  A Study of Operational Realities and Attitudes
The research findings reported on here were generated 
through ethnographic fieldwork generated in Rotterdam on 
a project that ran from 2010 until 2015 (Eski, 2015). During 
fieldwork, that took place from March 2011 until August 
2012, port police officers, customs officers and security of-
ficers were accompanied and their daily work lives in their 
familiar work environments were documented by walking 
along, driving along, sailing along and doing office work. A 
close-up, ethnographic account was made thus possible by 
literally being positioned within the port facility perimeters, 
in port police stations and security companies, and in patrol 
cars and on ships. The ethnographic methods consisted of 
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doing interviews, participant observations and at-a-distance 
observations of 31 security officers, 30 port police officers and 
10 customs officers. They executed water- and landside pa-
trols, emergency responses, port traffic control, inspections 
at port facilities, containers and on-board ships, and prevent-
ing and investigating cases of drugs transport, theft, environ-
mental crime and terrorism. Some of these inspections were 
ISPS Code related, such as Port State Control (PSC) inspec-
tions, while other tasks involved establishing a Declaration of 
Security (DoS) or doing CCTV monitoring of the port facility 
perimeters. Registration of visitors, truckers and ship crews 
was also an important task of mostly security officers, and 
these daily tasks were documented and compiled into one 
document of raw material (over 2000 pages) and thematically 
analysed.
5.3  Key Findings on Multi-Agency Port Policing 
and Port Security Technologization
5.3.1  Multi-agency Partnership or Rivalry
Since the ISPS Code came into force in compliant ports 
in 2004, and due to other crucial port and maritime security 
laws, port police, security services and customs agencies start-
ed to cooperate (more closely) in Rotterdam (Hoogenboom, 
2010). This cooperation is referred to as multi-agency polic-
ing through public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Duijnhoven, 
2010; Perkins et al., 2007), and is a day to day reality for the 
participants. One participant, working in the security sector, 
explained that security services only care about money and 
not about the public interest of and in the port. Public author-
ities have “cleaner” goals, he argued, namely that of enforcing 
law and safeguarding the port. This ambivalent character of 
the public-private multi-agency in the port leaves behind bi-
ases towards each other, preventing or at least slowing doing 
smooth cooperation, and in extreme situations, these biases 
stimulate multi-agency conflict instead of cooperation.
A significant issue of conflict for security officers is their 
desire to receive more information from port police officers 
and the customs agency, which they do not readily receive. 
While security officers, they argue, do provide significant 
amounts of intelligence to port police and customs, this is 
without receiving any feedback, let alone sensitive, protected 
information. Security officers, and the few security managers 
interviewed, realise and agree that the limited information 
they receive from law enforcement in the port results from 
legal restraints on the port police and customs officers to share 
with private parties, such as the security services. This leads to 
an asymmetrical relationship within multi-agency policing of 
the port nevertheless:
The moment you try [to receive information] from the po-
lice, well, then politics enter. Rules come into play, and then 
walls are built. […] The police thinks: ‘This is police property 
and is therefore NOT yours’ or vice versa. […] We’re all doing 
our thing, whether it is customs, port police, or security services, 
almost no interaction takes place there … we all have our own 
little systems, our own sources, all of our stuff that’s coming in 
(Security manager, personal communication).
This specific conflict of port security intelligence inter-
ests, in relation to one’s information position and between the 
private security industry and public authorities, is therefore a 
familiar one. Initiatives to stimulate more information shar-
ing between different policing organizations of the port polic-
ing multi-agency, for example, could lead to conflict between 
those organizations. 
On the security officers’ side—and also on the port po-
lice and customs officers’ side—there is suspicion about other 
multi-agency parties not willing to cooperate and there are 
negative stereotypes about each other. In the security officers’ 
case, suspicion and negative stereotyping emerges from their 
having less authority than port police and customs officers. In 
particular, they assert that the power to arrest is what makes 
the difference between a security officer and a police officer, 
and it leads to a low(er) self-image of one’s own occupational 
role in securing the port:
We just need [the port police]. In turn, they [need] us less 
though, because to them we don’t really matter (Security officer 
1, personal communication).
There were security officers who deeply despised police 
officers:
There are cops here… we… don’t like each other. I hate those 
cops. […] Don’t want to do anything with any of them. […] 
But we do make more money than [them]! (Security officer 2, 
personal communication).
In should be noted that in the above quote regarding a 
better wage than police officers, the participant feels better 
about his own line of work in port security. Still, dislike and 
distrust among each other at the operational level remains 
prevalent, leading to frustration on the job, perhaps not all 
the time, but it does play a role on a daily basis when port 
security is being established. It slows down communication 
and responses to emergency situations, which can have severe 
effects on the overall safety and security in a port. Another 
dimension relevant for the Port of Koper security department 
to learn from are the attitudes of frontline security officers re-
garding (the application of) security technologies.
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5.3.2  Technologization of Port Security
The ISPS Code and EU directives have led to increasing 
technological developments in the ports, according to secu-
rity officers, who were however, cynical about having to work 
with more surveillance and registration systems. Their atti-
tudes reflect a fear of technology in their worker realities:
Before you didn’t have that, each company had its own 
security guard or security services, right? But nowadays, they 
[port terminals] only do it [hiring security officers] when it’s ab-
solutely necessary, and they invest in expensive alarm systems, 
you know? […] I remember how you would sit there with three 
people, at night two people at the minimum. Now you’re alone 
[at night]. Back then though you had one little camera directed 
at the gate. Now we have 55 cameras. […] The moment there’s 
something wrong somewhere, that camera will directly go to it! 
You attend to it, and most of times it’s a little bird, and when 
you see trouble, yeah, you call 112. We are not allowed to even 
go there! (Security officer 3, personal communication).
The concluding sentence above especially reflects how 
this participant experienced limitations in his job, as he is not 
allowed to take any action even though he observed an inse-
cure situation. He had to wait passively in the security lodge. 
Of course, this means a safer way of securing the terminal for 
him and his colleagues, but nevertheless, for him it meant not 
being allowed to exercise his job to the fullest extent. In the 
day to day experience, therefore, security officers can experi-
ence how technology pacifies the worker, and in the mind of 
the security officer, remaining passive increases the possibility 
for an insecure situation to remain unresolved or to get worse.
Many more security officers felt pacified by technology, 
and they are worried that their job position is threatened by 
technological solutions, which is a recurring complexity of 
technologization (Adam & Allan, 2014; Smith, 1989). They 
can be replaced by technology, and even if they keep their 
job, the nature of the job changes, it was argued. Participants 
would explain that it requires the right people for handling 
such systems, preferably people with the right knowledge and 
educational background:
It’s about the equipment AND people, because people you 
employ, they should be able to work with it of course, but they 
should have the obligated papers [e.g. certificates] (Security of-
ficer 4, personal communication).
Thus, if new technological advancements are to work, op-
erational officers must perceive the operating of security and 
surveillance systems to be undertaken by well-educated staff, 
to which they do think they do not belong. The more complex 
a technological application becomes and has an actual posi-
tive effect on security, the more participants expect operators 
to be better educated. Otherwise, such technologies are not 
expected to have any significant effect at all. The effectiveness 
of (new) technology, in the eyes of the participants, does not 
depend on the technology itself, but on the capabilities of the 
one who has to work with it.
In addition, technology is referred to as a means to ob-
tain a secured situation in the port environment by the par-
ticipants, but not without the interference of the “human 
element”. Any technology that shuns the idea of being fully 
operational by itself and still be completely reliable, will not 
be taken seriously. Such technology therefore influences its 
own (non-)acceptance within the port security domain and 
by those responsible for operational port security. On a simi-
lar note, the increasing multiplicity and complexity of tasks as 
a result from having fewer personnel that can operate more 
systems, leads to errors, security officers explained:
We have to have CCTV camera’s, in the system, and we 
have to look around the territory with those camera’s regularly. 
Well, then you notice, because of the workload, you are not able 
to do so (Security officer 5, personal communication).
In a nutshell, increasing technologization of port security 
and surveillance could result in fewer people operating more 
systems, which bares the creation of security officers being 
too busy with not risking to make an error. After all, an error 
leads to a negative evaluation of one’s job performance, as was 
indicated. Human errors because of handling technologies 
wrongly, leads to participants experiencing stigmatization, 
because all their errors on the job are recorded. As much as 
their own job is to control the security situation in a port with 
technological solutions, to be (more) controlled by techno-
logically advanced registration systems, leads to fears of being 
stigmatized. They feel they are not allowed to make mistakes, 
which makes them experience the incapability to live up to 
the expectations of their superiors, and that frustrates them.
Besides having these frustrations and fears, there is the 
possible fear of criminogenic effects because of technology. 
Whatever you may undertake in order to control and secure 
with whatever new technologies there are available, security 
officers (as well as participants at the port police and customs 
agencies) believe that their criminal counterpart (e.g. drug 
trafficker, human traffickers, terrorists) that illegally obtains 
technologies or advances its own technological supremacy is 
problematic. The War on Terror brought about much tech-
nological development (Ceyhan, 2008), and given the end-
users’ perceptions of port security technology, it seems the 
participants are afraid of technological developments made 
for themselves that could easily be used by a hostile party 
as well.
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Another concern of security officers about the technolo-
gization of their daily work is that the purchase of (new) tech-
nologies may not always be done so for port security per se:
When you’re at a construction site and you use your [ther-
mographic] camera, you can indeed see someone walking. It of 
course has its function, but sometimes I think you don’t use it 
that often actually. It’s a bit of eye-catching for the customers [I 
secure for]. […] A bit of commercial logic (Security officer 6, 
personal communication).
The security officer thinks its use is only convenient eve-
ry so often, and has doubts about the true intention behind 
the purchase of this technology. In his opinion, his company 
wants to look like a professional security company by having 
“shiny boxes” of cutting-edge technological equipment that 
attracts (new) clients, instead of having sensible solutions for 
present and relevant insecurities in the port environment. 
6  Recommendations for the Port of Koper
The growth of the Port of Koper is continuing, which 
will lead to more complex, dynamic and challenging secu-
rity environments in Koper. As mentioned above, the Port 
of Koper security department management is aware of these 
changing security challenges and shortages in the security 
department’s capacity to provide effective and reliable secu-
rity levels. There are solutions available, however, time and 
money should be invested. What also matters is political de-
cision-making at the national level, because ‘[t]o address the 
challenge of maritime security effectively, a paradigm shift 
is required’ (Nation, 2013: 207). Such a shift, requires the 
Slovenian government to move beyond ‘the national domain 
into a multilateral context, facilitating greater cooperation 
and interoperability among all regional organizations, states, 
and agencies with maritime responsibilities. […] [and] co-
ordination in the area of maritime security could serve as an 
impetus to regional cooperation in South East Europe as a 
whole’ (Nation, 2013). It is then necessary for the Slovenian 
government to re-evaluate the regulations of the private se-
curity sector, in order to enable private security to become 
more efficient in the port, while releasing port police forces 
from certain security tasks who in turn can intensify their 
particular typical police-related tasks, such as investigations. 
However, seen from an anchored pluralist perspective on se-
curity governance (Loader & Walker, 2007), the state still has 
the duty to make sure port security provided by stakeholders 
(especially private) is monitored and legally sound.
National critical infrastructures secured by such security 
services, in accordance with private security sector law, should 
have high priority for the Port of Koper as well. Slovenia has 
been privatizing significant amounts of its public tasks to 
the private sector, such as is the case with the nuclear power 
plant in Krško which has a special regulation about security 
as issued by the Ministry of the Interior (Pravilnik o fizičnem 
varovanju jedrskih objektov, jedrskih in radioaktivnih snovi 
ter prevozov jedrskih snovi, 2013). Although there are certain 
efforts toward strengthening private and public (national) 
security sector cooperation, the improvements are still weak 
and too slow in relation to national legislation that arranges 
port and maritime security.
Up-to-date and real time information coming from a wide 
variety of intelligence sources is essential to maintain security 
and deter threats. Therefore, exchange of (real time) intelli-
gence is a matter of cooperation between the security services, 
in particular operational security managers and security offic-
ers, and law enforcement, such as the port police and pref-
erably the customs agencies as well. Under the umbrella of 
dedicated organizations and associations (e.g. the Slovenian 
Private Security Sector Board, the IMO, the COESS, and the 
EU), such a network of port security stakeholders could be 
further developed. Under specific procedures and vetting, 
the membership to that network can be granted, enabling 
its members to share and retrieve security intelligence with-
out having to fear one might be breaking the law. Something 
similar has been attempted for the Port of Rotterdam, where 
the Seaport Police Rotterdam, Securitas and Trigion agreed to 
exchange intelligence with each other (RTV Rijnmond, 2011).
The Port of Koper is a domain where it is logical to intro-
duce and develop such information sharing and (further) pri-
vatization of port security and delegate tasks to security ser-
vices. There is much support in the port business community 
to make the necessary efforts for implementation of solutions 
that are available (Luka Koper, 2015b). The primary aim is to 
establish and organize an effective corporate security system 
that will assure proactive and efficient safety and security in 
and for the Port of Koper. To efficiently maintain adequate 
levels of security and respond and handle different incidents, 
it is necessary to develop the Port of Koper security system on 
a higher level, keeping in mind the current status of the Port 
of Koper and its development plans for the future, in which a 
corporate security system is a must. Security coordination is 
important between company managers and other stakehold-
ers. The organization of multi-agency communication and 
coordination demands additional training of dedicated man-
agers in departments that are responsible and authorized for 
specialised security functions in the department. This is espe-
cially important at the operational level. Key advancements 
that must be made to reach this aim consist of an expansion of 
security capacity by working together (more closely) with 1) 
security services who provide security officers and 2) the (re)
consideration of (new) technologies to use. 
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Based on the lessons learned from the study explored in 
the previous section, it will be crucial for the Port of Koper 
security department to consider the demanding, and possibly 
conflictive character of multi-agency policing and delivering 
port security within a network of multiple public-private part-
ners. It became apparent that there are biases among security 
officers towards other multi-agency actors, in particular the 
port police that need to be overcome in order to prevent the 
disruption of smooth cooperation and potential conflicts. A 
significant issue for the Port of Koper to avoid, or at least to be 
kept at a minimum, is security officers’ experience in sharing 
information with public authorities such as the port police. 
Initiatives to share more information with each other should 
not lead to its contradictory consequence, which is an unwill-
ingness to share information. Moreover, it is as important to 
get rid of suspicion regarding the other multi-agency parties 
and prevent negative stereotyping of each other. In particular, 
security officers could again experience inequality because of 
having less authority than the port police. This needs to be 
exposed, discussed and agreed on among all relevant parties. 
Authority jealousy, suspicion and negative stereotyping can 
lead to frustration on the job, and could eventually lead to 
miscommunication and slow(er) responses to emergency sit-
uations. Altogether it could have severe effects on the overall 
safety and security of the Port of Koper, and therefore of the 
maritime transport in Central and Southeast Europe.
Another prominent recommendation for the Port of 
Koper, based on this study, is to be aware of concerns of secu-
rity officers about (further) technologization within the port 
security domain. It became clear that the security officers in 
Rotterdam were cynical about the application of additional 
port security technologies. They even fear the dehumanizing 
and pacifying effects of technology in their daily tasks to se-
cure the port. Port security (technological) innovation in the 
Port of Koper should never lead to creation of such fears and 
insecurity, because it can, like multi-agency conflict and mis-
communication, increase the chances that an insecure situa-
tion remains unresolved or becomes worse. Participants have 
additional worries about not having the right (IT) capabilities 
and capacities to work with (new) systems and technologies, 
which could lead to non-acceptance of security systems as 
well. Whereas, they should actually improve their work and 
therefore the overall port security situation. The Port of Koper 
security department therefore needs to make serious efforts 
in training security officers in handling IT-systems and tech-
nologies they are unfamiliar with, otherwise, the installation 
of the planned corporate security system may have no effect 
whatsoever on port security in Koper. Perhaps even an oppo-
site effect. It is also essential to open up the debate about not 
having to fear a partial if not complete take-over of hands-on 
security work by technology. The human element should re-
main present in providing port security and therefore there 
should be an acceptable space to make errors. This is a risk 
that is inherently part of providing port security, if one wants 
to keep the human factor. Henceforth, it is crucial for the Port 
of Koper to establish trust among security staff in novel secu-
rity technologies, while making sure that the security officers, 
who literally are the human element, are not replaced.
Finally, and not immediately coming forward from this 
study’s results but rather from the fact the study was under-
taken in the port security domain, and conducted from a 
criminological perspective, it is strongly recommended that 
the Port of Koper security department makes use of several 
relevant fields of expertise and experts. Experts in the fields 
of criminology, security, maritime and port engineering, sta-
tistical analysis, and prevention and disaster management are 
needed to create and critically re-evaluate efficient security 
systems to benefit the Port of Koper’s security, and eventually 
the flow of transport in and out of Slovenia.
7  Conclusion
In this paper, the authors argue that the Port of Koper is an 
important port that functions as a vital transport hub for not 
just Central Europe, but also the coastal zone and hinterland 
of Southeast Europe. An historical overview of the port was 
outlined, as well as an indication of the current geo-economic 
ambitions of the port. This was followed by an explanation of 
the ISPS Code – the most important legislation for maritime 
and port security – and which specific threats there are for 
the Port of Koper, and which organisations are responsible to 
deal with these and other types of security challenges. More 
importantly, the port security ambitions of the Port of Koper 
were described, of which the main aim is to join forces with 
security services that will become responsible for specific port 
security tasks in the Port of Koper. In order to have provided 
the specific recommendations for the Port of Koper to take 
into account when fulfilling its aim to put a corporate secu-
rity system in place, the authors discussed an ethnographic 
study of Port of Rotterdam security officers who fulfil those 
exact corporate security system-related tasks in Rotterdam. 
Therefore, the core of this paper consisted of which lessons 
there can be learned from the Rotterdam study. The two key 
findings relevant to the recommendations were the attitudes 
of security officers towards multi-agency policing of the port 
and their attitudes towards the technologization of their daily 
work. From these findings, several recommendations were 
drawn and described in the previous section, and the autors 
strongly recommend that the Port of Koper takes notice of 
specific multi-agency cooperation related struggles and chal-
lenges, and should be cautious about the application of secu-
289
Yarin Eski, Boris Kankaraš: Security Challenges in the Port of Koper: the Status Quo and Recommendations
rity technologies. It is crucial to be real about multi-agency 
policing and about the human element in port security (tech-
nologies). In conclusion, if the Port of Koper will consider 
these dimensions seriously, the improvement of its port secu-
rity is very well possible.
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Varnostni izzivi v Luki Koper: status quo in priporočila
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Koprsko pristanišče (Luka Koper) predstavlja ključno transportno povezavo za Srednjo in Jugovzhodno Evropo. Prispevek podaja 
vpogled v pristanišče in njegovo varnost. V uvodu so predstavljeni zgodovina razvoja in geoekonomski cilji pristanišča. Nato se 
prispevek natančneje osredotoči na Mednarodni zakonik o varnosti ladij in pristanišč (angl. International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code – ISPS), ki tako kot za večino pristanišč velja tudi za koprsko pristanišče. V nadaljevanju članek obravnava upravljanje z varnostjo, 
sledi pregled etnografske študije pristaniške varnosti v pristanišču Rotterdam (Eski, 2015) ter priporočila za nadgradnjo varnosti v 
koprskem pristanišču. Luka Koper želi vzpostaviti varnostni sistem, ki bo vzpostavil takšno organizacijo varnostnih služb, ki bodo 
pristojne za posamezna specifična varnostna področja in naloge, kar omogoča pluralno policijsko dejavnost in pri tem predvideva 
tudi intenzivnejšo uporabo sodobnih varnostnotehničnih sistemov. Priporočila izpostavljajo izzive, ki jih je treba upoštevati ob takšni 
organizaciji varnosti in mogočih reakcijah posameznikov na povečano implementacijo varnostnotehničnih sistemov in tehnologij.
Ključne besede: pristaniška varnost, Luka Koper, pristanišče Rotterdam, pluralna policijska dejavnost, tehnologizacija 
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